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Abstract
Recent work has distinguished “harm” from “purity” violations, but how does an act get classified as belonging to a
domain in the first place? We demonstrate the impact of not only the kind of action (e.g., harmful versus impure) but
also its target (e.g., oneself versus another). Across two experiments, common signatures of harm and purity tracked
with other-directed and self-directed actions, respectively. First, participants judged self-directed acts as primarily
impure  and  other-directed  acts  as  primarily  harmful.  Second,  conservatism  predicted  harsher  judgments  of  self-
directed  but  not  other-directed  acts.  Third,  while  participants  delivered  harsher  judgments  of  intentional  versus
accidental acts, this effect was smaller for self-directed than other-directed acts. Finally, participants judged self-
directed acts more harshly when focusing on the actor’s character versus the action itself; other-directed acts elicited
the opposite pattern. These findings suggest that moral domains are defined not only by the kind of action but also by
the target of the action.
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Introduction
People  judge  many  different  acts  to  be  immoral,  from
terrorism  to  tax  evasion,  from  murder  to  masturbation.
Researchers  have  suggested  that  moral  judgments  hang
together in “moral domains”, for example, “harm” (e.g., assault,
humiliation), “fairness” (e.g., lying, cheating), and “purity” (e.g.,
eating  taboo  substances,  committing  incest),  to  name  a  few
[1–4].  Here,  we  focus  on  folk  intuitions  about  two  domains:
harm and purity.
The  current  work  builds  directly  on  existing  evidence  for
organizing  harm  violations  and  purity  violations  into  distinct
moral  domains.  First,  moral  judgments  across  putatively
distinct domains may derive from distinct affective responses
[5–9] (but see 10). As prior work has shown, moral judgments
of  harm  and  purity  violations  are  rooted  in  the  emotional
responses  of  anger  and  disgust,  respectively  [1,11–13].  We
note  that  while  some  work  shows  violations  of  harm  and
fairness  norms  to  elicit  reactions  of  disgust  as  well  [14–19],
recent  research  suggests  that  disgust  in  response  to  harm
violations may be more similar to anger, relative to disgust in
response  to  purity  violations  [11,13,20,21].  Nevertheless,  to
account  for  semantic  overlap  of  anger  and  disgust,  here  we
assess  the  effects  of  our  manipulations  on  disgust  that  are
unrelated to the analogous effects on anger, and vice versa (for
a  similar  method  and  discussion,  see  11,13,20;  see  also
General  Discussion).  Second,  different  moral  values  are
endorsed  to  a  different  extent  across  different  socio-cultural
groups. In particular, social conservatives tend to judge purity
violations  more  harshly,  compared  to  liberals,  whereas  both
groups judge harms similarly [3,7,22,23] (see also 24). Third,
recent  evidence  reveals  that  moral  judgments  of  harm  and
purity  violations  rely  on  distinct  cognitive  processes,  as
suggested by neural data [25]-[28] and patterns of behavioral
responses  (for  reviews,  see  4,29).  Relative  to  judgments  of
harm violations, judgments of purity violations are influenced to
a  lesser  extent  by  contextual  information  [21],  information
about the violator’s reasons for acting [30,31], and, of central
importance  for  the  current  research,  information  about  the
violator’s intent [32,20].
What makes an act a harm violation versus a purity
violation?
While  recent  work  has  highlighted  important  differences
between harm and purity judgments, an outstanding question is
this: how do people perceive an action to be a harm violation or
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categorization” relies on a complex set of cues. We examine
the features of an act that lead to its categorization as a harm
violation or a purity violation.
Consider  two  moral  violations  featured  in  prior  proposals
[2,6]:  “sticking  a  pin  into  the  palm  of  a  child”  (harm),  and
“cooking and eating human flesh” (purity). While both actions
may  be  considered  immoral,  they  differ  along  a  number  of
dimensions. An obvious difference is that one act is physically
harmful, while the other act is impure or defiling. A closer look
at  these  examples  though  reveals  that  these  violations  also
differ, implicitly, in terms of the target of the act–in other words,
not simply what is being done but to whom–the child versus
one’s own self (cf. [33]). The “harm violation” is dyadic or other-
directed, involving an agent (violator) acting on a target (victim)
[33,34].  By  contrast,  the  “purity  violation”  is  not  obviously
dyadic. Assuming that the human flesh was privately obtained
from an individual who was already deceased, the cannibalistic
act appears private and, importantly, immoral even under these
restricted  conditions;  one’s  own  self  represents  both  violator
and  “victim”  of  the  act.  Even  when  purity  violations  involve
more  than  one  person,  i.e.,  incest  between  two  consenting
adults,  it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  that  one  of  them  is  a
victim. Often the agents themselves are the only ones who are
directly  affected  by  their  own  impure  or  defiling  actions,  so
there  are  no  other  victims.  Notably,  and,  foreshadowing  our
hypotheses,  researchers  have  specifically  designed  purity
violations  to  be  non-dyadic  in  order  to  investigate  moral
intuitions that are not related to perceived harm [6,20,21].
The present hypothesis is that the target or victim of an act
plays  a  critical  additional  role  in  determining  how  moral
violations are processed. One specific prediction is that other-
directed  violations  (both  harmful  and  impure  acts)  are
processed  as  relatively  more  harmful,  whereas  self-directed
violations  (both  harmful  and  impure  acts)  are  processed  as
relatively more impure.
These predictions can be understood within a biological or
cultural evolutionary perspective on moral domains: intuitions
across  moral  domains  may  have  evolved  to  address  distinct
adaptive challenges. For example, harm norms may serve to
regulate  interpersonal  behavior  [2,34],  whereas  purity  norms
may serve to protect oneself from exposure to pathogens (e.g.,
via  food  or  sex)  [1,15,21,35–37].  Thus,  harm  norms  might
apply  to  dyadic  interactions  or  other-directed  actions  (i.e.,  a
violator acts on a victim) as opposed to self-directed actions
[33]. Conversely, purity norms might apply to a broader set of
behaviors  that  are  potentially  harmful  to  the  self
[15,24,36,38–40].
The  proposed  function  of  purity  norms  also  hints  at  an
explanation for the idiosyncrasies of purity judgments found in
prior research, as outlined above. If a person is infected with a
contagious disease, our judgment of that person as dangerous
need  not  depend  on  the  person’s  innocent  intent  or  other
contextual factors (cf. [20,32]). It is enough for us to know that
the  person  is  “tainted”  and  ought  to  be  avoided  [1]  -  note
though that intuitions supporting pathogen avoidance are not
always moralized (see 37 for discussion). By contrast, intent
information  may  be  critical  for  assigning  moral  blame  to  a
person for having caused harm to others [41–43], as well as for
predicting a person’s future harmful behaviors [44].
The Present Research
We  examined  the  impact  of  the  target  of  an  action  (i.e.,
oneself  versus  another  person)  in  determining  moral  domain
membership. We relied on key behavioral “signatures” used in
prior  work  and  described  above  for  distinguishing  between
domains.
Perceived  Harmfulness  and  Impurity.    First,  “harm
violations”  are  judged  primarily  as  harmful,  whereas  “purity
violations”  are  judged  primarily  as  impure  [13].  While  we
expected to find this same pattern in our data, we additionally
predicted  that  self-directed  acts  (both  harmful  and  impure)
would be judged primarily as impure, while other-directed acts
(both  harmful  and  impure)  would  be  judged  primarily  as
harmful.
Social  Conservatism.    Second,  social  conservatism  has
been  shown  to  influence  moral  judgment,  such  that
conservatives versus liberals tend to judge “purity violations” as
morally  worse  [3].  Judgments  of  “harm  violations”  differ  less
across the political spectrum; liberals and conservatives alike
appear to agree that harms are morally wrong. We predicted
that social conservatism would correlate with moral judgment to
a  greater  extent  for  self-directed  acts  versus  other-directed
acts.
The Role of Intent.  Third, intentional violations are typically
judged as morally worse than accidental violations; however,
the  magnitude  of  this  difference  differs  across  domains.
Specifically,  intent  plays  a  larger  role  in  judgments  of  “harm
violations”  relative  to  judgments  of  “purity  violations”  [20,32].
We predicted that in addition intent also plays a larger role in
judgments of other-directed versus self-directed acts.
Moral  Focus  on  Action  versus  Character.    Fourth,  prior
work  has  found  that  people  judge  some  acts  to  be  morally
wrong, whereas they judge other acts as more informative of
the  actor’s  poor  moral  character  [45,46]  (see  also  47).  We
hypothesized that, compared to judgments of “harm violations”
and  other-directed  acts,  judgments  of  “purity  violations”  and
self-directed  acts  reflect  more  poorly  on  the  agent’s  moral
character, and less on the moral status of the act itself. We
thus explored interactions among the following variables: action
type (harmful versus impure), target (other-directed versus self-
directed),  and  moral  focus  (whether  participants  made  moral
judgments focusing on the action versus character).
Experiment 1: Self-directed Acts, Purity, and
Intent
Experiment 1 tested our four key predictions within a single
paradigm.  Participants  made  moral  judgments,  as  well  as
judgments of perceived harmfulness and impurity, of acts that
varied along the following dimensions: (1) action: whether the
act was defined a priori as harmful or impure (e.g., physical
harm vs. exposure to bodily fluids), (2) target: whether the act
was other-directed or self-directed, (3) intent: whether the act
was  intentional  or  accidental,  and  (4)  moral  focus:  whether
participants made judgments of the action or character.
What Determines a Moral Domain?
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Participants.  We recruited 410 participants (254 male; Mage
=  29.2,  SDage  =  9.3)  using  Amazon  Mechanical  Turk
(www.mturk.com). Participants were English speakers from the
United  States  and  paid  sixteen  cents  for  their  time.  79
participants (19%) were excluded from analysis for failing an
attention check (i.e., to recall the name of the protagonist in the
scenarios). Both Experiments 1 and 2 were approved by the
Boston  College  Internal  Review  Board.  In  both  experiments,
participants  completed  an  IRB-approved  consenting  process,
viewing  an  online  consent  document  and  indicating  their
consent via mouse click before proceeding to the tasks.
Procedure.    In  a  2  (action:  harmful  versus  impure)  x  2
(target:  other-directed  versus  self-directed)  x  2  (intent:
intentional  vs.  accidental)  between-subjects  design,
participants  read  four  scenarios  depicting  a  character
committing  an  unethical  act  (e.g.,  Imagine  that  Steven
intentionally punched someone in the ribs; see Text S2). For a
single participant, all four scenarios depicted behavior from a
single condition (e.g., harmful, other-directed, intentional).
For  each  scenario,  participants  made  five  judgments.
Participants first provided a moral judgment either of the action
(How morally wrong is this behavior?) or of the character (How
immoral  is  Steven  as  a  person?).  Question  type  (i.e.,  action
versus  character)  was  randomized  across  scenarios  within
participants.  The  order  of  the  next  four  measures  was
randomized across scenarios within participants: unnaturalness
(How much does this violate the natural order of things - how
unnatural is this?), disgust (How disgusted do you feel about
this?), damage (How damaging is this?), and anger (How angry
do  you  feel  about  this?).  After  rating  all  four  scenarios,
participants  completed  a  brief  demographics  section,  which
included a single self-report measure of social conservatism.
All ratings were made on 7-point Likert scales (see Text S2).
Judgments were averaged across the four scenarios prior to
analysis (Crohnbach’sα: Moral = .90; Unnatural = .86; Disgust
= .87; Damage = .83; Anger = .88).
Results and Discussion
We  report  results  from  four  analyses  of  the  data,  each  of
which tested one of our four key predictions. We first report
results from an analysis of judgments of perceived harmfulness
and  perceived  impurity  (Prediction  1).  We  then  report  the
results of regression analyses predicting moral judgments from
social  conservatism  (and  experimental  manipulations)
(Prediction  2).  Finally,  we  report  results  from  an  analysis  of
moral  judgments,  focusing  on  the  interactions  among  the
variables  action,  target,  and  intent  (Prediction  3),  and  moral
focus (Prediction 4).
Extracting  Impurity  and  Harmfulness
composites.    Participants  delivered  judgments  of
unnaturalness  and  disgust  [3,48],  designed  to  measure
perceived  impurity,  as  well  as  damage  and  anger  [3,13],
designed  to  measure  perceived  harmfulness.  Our  a  priori
grouping  of  measures  was  confirmed  by  a  principal
components  analysis  conducted  with  Varimax  rotation  on
participants’ judgments of unnaturalness, disgust, damage, and
anger. The first two components accounted for 87.9% of the
variance  in  the  data.  As  shown  in  Table  1,  rotated  factor
loadings show that the two highest-loading measures for the
first component were unnaturalness and disgust, while the two
highest-loading  measures  on  the  second  component  were
damage  and  anger.  Unnaturalness  and  disgust  judgments
(r(331)  =  .73,  p  <  .001)  were  then  averaged  to  produce  a
composite  of  perceived  impurity,  while  anger  and  damage
judgments (r(331) = .66, p < .001) were averaged to form a
composite  of  perceived  harmfulness.  We  report  analyses  of
measures  used  to  construct  the  composites  in  Text  S1  and
Figure S1.
Prediction 1: Harmfulness and Impurity.  “Harm violations”
and “purity violations” are typically judged primarily as harmful
and  impure,  respectively  [13].  Here,  we  examined  whether
perceptions of harmfulness and impurity depend additionally on
the  target  of  the  violation.  We  then  conducted  a  2  (action:
harmful versus impure) x 2 (target: other-directed versus self-
directed)  x  2  (composite:  harmfulness  and  impurity)  mixed
effects ANOVA.
Main Effects.  Participants judged acts to be more impure
(M = 4.6, SE = .12) than harmful (M = 4.2, SE = .12) on the
whole (main effect of composite; F(1,327) = 25.79, p < .001, ηp
2
= .07). Participants also delivered “harsher” judgments (more
impure and harmful) for impure acts (M = 4.7, SE = .11) versus
harmful acts (M = 4.3, SE = .12) (main effect of action; F(1,327)
=  6.9,  p  =  .009,  ηp
2  =  .02).  Finally,  participants  delivered
“harsher”  judgments  (more  impure  and  harmful)  for  other-
directed acts (M = 4.8, SE = .11) versus self-directed acts (M =
4.2, SE = .11) (main effect of target; F(1,327) = 18.37, p < .001,
ηp
2 = .05).
Action,  Harmfulness,  and  Impurity.    An  interaction
emerged between action and composite (F(1,327) = 106.05, p
< .001, ηp
2 = .25), indicating that harmful acts were judged as
more harmful (M = 4.4, SE = .12) than impure (M = 4.2, SE = .
12)  (t(149)  =  -3.78,  p  <  .001),  whereas  impure  acts  were
judged as more impure (M = 5.1, SE = .11) than harmful (M =
4.3, SE = .11) (t(180) = 10.47, p < .001). In addition, impure
acts were judged as more impure relative to harmful acts (M =
4.2,  SE  =  .12)  (t(329)  =  5.69,  p  <  .001),  while  harmful  and
impure acts were judged as similarly harmful (M = 4.3, SE = .
11)  (t(329)  =  -.67,  p  =  .5).  This  analysis  served  as  a  basic
check  of  the  action  (harmful  vs.  impure)  manipulation,  while
also  supporting  the  validity  of  the  impurity  and  harmfulness
composites.
Target, Harmfulness, and Impurity.  Given our hypothesis
that the target of a moral violation determines how the violation
is  processed  (i.e.,  as  harmful  or  impure),  we  predicted  links
Table  1.  Harmfulness  and  Impurity  Composite  Factor
Scores for measures in Experiment 1.
  PC1 PC2
Unnaturalness .75 .52
Disgust .94 .18
Damage .25 .95
Anger .69 .58
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0074434.t001
What Determines a Moral Domain?
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e74434between  self-directed  violations  and  impurity  judgments,  and
between other-directed violations and harmfulness judgments.
Consistent with this prediction, we found a target x composite
interaction (F(1,327) = 12.35, p = .001, ηp
2 = .04). Participants
judged other-directed acts to be similarly impure (M = 4.9, SE
= .12) and harmful (M = 4.8, SE = .11) (t(168) = 1.86, p = .06),
but, critically, participants judged self-directed acts to be more
impure (M = 4.4, SE = .13) than harmful (M = 3.9, SE = .12)
(t(161) = 5.10, p < .001).
Because the harmfulness and impurity composites are highly
related (r(331) = .76, p < .001), it is also useful to examine the
unique  effects  of  our  manipulations  on  each  composite,
controlling  for  the  effects  on  the  other  composite  (see
11,13,20).
We thus conducted the same ANOVA presented above on
composites that measured unique variance in harmfulness and
impurity. We computed these composites as the standardized
residual  values  in  impurity,  predicted  from  harmfulness,  and
vice versa. Effects of action and target on each composite are
shown in Figure 1. As above, an interaction emerged between
action and composite (F(1,327) = 104.49, p < .001, ηp
2 = .24),
indicating that harmful acts were judged as more harmful (M = .
44, SE = .07) than impure (M = -.55, SE = .07) (t(149) = -8.06,
p < .001), and also more harmful compared to impure acts (M =
-.37, SE = .07) (t(329) = -8.0, p < .001). By contrast, impure
acts  were  rated  as  more  impure  (M  =  .46,  SE  =  .06)  than
harmful (M = -.37, SE = .07) (t(180) = 6.29, p < .001), and also
as more impure compared to harmful acts (M = -.55, SE = .07)
(t(329) = 10.47, p < .001).
In addition, as above, an interaction emerged between target
and  composite  (F(1,327)  =  13.17,  p  <  .001,  ηp
2  =  .04).
Participants judged other-directed acts to be more harmful (M
= .27, SE = .07) than impure (M = -.13, SE = .07) (t(168) =
-2.73,  p  =  .007),  and  also  more  harmful  compared  to  self-
directed acts (M = -.21, SE = .07) (t(329) = 4.56. p < .001). By
contrast,  participants  judged  self-directed  acts  to  be  more
impure (M = .04, SE = .07) than harmful (M = -.21, SE = .07)
(t(161) = 2.0, p = .047), and also trended toward judging self-
directed acts as more impure compared to other-directed acts
(M = -.13, SE = .07) (t(329) = -1.52. p = .13).
Notably,  comparing  conditions  that  share  “features”  (i.e.,
action, target) of both harm and purity violations reveals a key
role for target in determining domain membership. Specifically,
self-directed harmful acts were judged as more impure (M = .
32, SE = .09) than harmful (M = -.07, SE = .09) (t(92) = 2.59, p
=  .01);  self-directed  harmful  acts  were  also  judged  as  more
impure than other-directed impure acts (M = -.53, SE = .11)
(t(165)  =  5.99,  p  <  .001).  By  contrast,  other-directed  impure
acts were judged as more harmful (M = .26, SE = .10) than
impure (M = -.53, SE = .11) (t(73) = -3.75, p < .001); other-
directed impure acts were also judged as more harmful than
self-directed harmful acts (M = -.07, SE = .09) (t(165) = -2.50, p
= .01).
Action and Target.  There were no significant interactions
between action and target (F(1,327) = .004, p = .95, ηp
2 < .001),
or between action, target and composite (F(1,327) = 1.83, p = .
18,  ηp
2  <  .01),  suggesting  that  action  type  (harmful  versus
impure)  and  target  (other-directed  versus  self-directed)  play
independent roles in determining moral domain.
Prediction  2:  Social  Conservatism.    While  social
conservatives and liberals alike agree that harm violations are
immoral,  they  do  not  necessarily  agree  as  to  whether  purity
violations  (e.g.,  eating  one’s  dead  dog)  are  immoral.  Recent
research  indicates  that  social  conservatism  predicts  harsher
judgments of purity violations but not harm violations [3,7,49].
We  therefore  examined  whether  social  conservatism  would
also interact with the target of moral violations. For example,
would social conservatism predict harsher moral judgments of
self-directed  acts  in  particular?  We  conducted  a  linear
regression  predicting  moral  severity  from  self-reported  social
conservatism,  action  (harmful  versus  impure),  target  (other-
directed  versus  self-directed),  intent  (intentional  versus
accidental), and judgment type (action versus character), while
also probing interaction effects between conservatism and the
four manipulations.
Action, Target, and Social Conservatism.  The predictors
explained 34% of the variance in moral judgment (F(9,321) =
18.20, p < .001). As shown in Table 2, we found significant
effects of target and intent, such that other-directed acts were
judged as worse than self-directed acts, and intentional acts
were  judged  as  worse  than  accidental  acts.  There  were  no
unique  predictive  effects  for  action  or  moral  focus.  Greater
conservatism  predicted  harsher  moral  judgments  overall.  We
found  no  interaction  between  conservatism  and  action,
indicating  that  conservatism  predicted  moral  judgment  to  a
similar extent for harmful and impure acts. However, in line with
our novel prediction, we found a significant interaction between
conservatism and target, indicating that greater conservatism
predicted harsher moral judgments, to a greater extent for self-
directed acts relative to other-directed acts. Notably, although
other-directed acts were rated as worse than self-directed acts
in general, judgments were still well below the maximum rating
(M  =  4.7  out  of  7).  Response  variance  was  also  similar  for
moral judgments of self-directed and other-directed acts (SE = .
13 for both). Thus, the low predictive power of conservatism for
moral judgments of other-directed acts does not appear to be
due  to  a  ceiling  effect  or  reduced  variance  in  responses.
Finally,  we  also  found  a  significant  interaction  between
conservatism  and  intent,  indicating  that  greater  conservatism
predicted  harsher  moral  judgments  to  a  greater  extent  for
accidental acts relative to intentional acts. In other words, intent
played  a  smaller  role  in  the  moral  judgments  of  social
conservatives versus liberals.
We conducted a follow-up 2 (action) x 2 (target) x 2 (intent) x
2 (conservatism) ANOVA based on a median split of the data
for  conservatism  (>3  versus  <=3).  Mirroring  the  regression
results, this analysis revealed “harsher” judgments overall by
participants high in conservatism (M = 4.44, SE = .13) versus
low in conservatism (M = 3.69, SE = .13) (F(1,315) = 17.64, p
<  .001,  ηp
2  =  .05).  Again,  we  found  an  interaction  between
target and conservatism (F(1,315) = 8.12, p = .005, ηp
2 = .03),
such that self-directed acts were judged as morally worse by
participants high in conservatism (M = 4.1, SE = .19) versus
participants low in conservatism (M = 2.9, SE = .18) (t(160) =
-3.68,  p  <  .001),  while  other-directed  acts  were  judged  as
What Determines a Moral Domain?
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e74434Figure 1.  Perceived Harmfulness and Impurity.  Composite judgments of harmfulness (dark bars) and impurity (light bars), in
raw form (1.a.) as well as standardized, controlling for effects on the opposing composite (1.b.). Error bars represent ± 1 SE.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0074434.g001
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SE = .18) and low in conservatism (M = 4.5, SE = .17) (t(167)
= .144, p = .88).
As  in  the  regression  results  reported  above,  we  found  no
action by conservatism interaction (F(1,315) = .01, p < .92, ηp
2
< .001). Finally, we found a marginal intent by conservatism
interaction (F(1,315) = 3.35, p = .07, ηp
2 = .01): accidental acts
were  given  “harsher”  judgments  by  participants  high  in
conservatism (M = 3.8, SE = .17) versus low in conservatism
(M  =  2.7,  SE  =  .19)  (t(162)  =  -4.14,  p  <  .001),  whereas
intentional  acts  were  judged  similarly  by  participants  high  in
conservatism (M = 5.1, SE = .20) versus low in conservatism
(M = 4.6, SE = .16) (t(165) = -1.42, p = .16).
Prediction  3:  The  Role  of  Intent  in  Moral
Judgments.  While intentional moral violations are generally
judged  as  morally  worse  than  accidental  violations,  previous
research has shown a differential role of intent across moral
domains  [20,21].  We  sought  to  examine  whether  the  role  of
intent depends on the action and/or target of moral violations.
We therefore conducted a 2 (action: harmful versus impure) x 2
(target:  other-directed  versus  self-directed)  x  2  (intent:
intentional versus accidental) x 2 (moral focus: action versus
character) ANOVA.
Main Effects.  Effects of action, target, and intent on moral
judgment  are  shown  in  Figure  2.  As  expected,  participants
judged intentional acts (M = 4.8, SE = .13) as morally worse
than accidental acts (M = 3.4, SE = .13) (F(1,402) = 62.47, p
< .001, ηp
2 = .17); participants also judged other-directed acts
(M = 4.7, SE = .13) as morally worse than self-directed acts (M
= 3.5, SE = .13) (F(1,402) = 39.55, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11). Finally,
participants delivered harsher moral judgments when focusing
on the action (M = 4.3, SE = .14) versus the character (M = 3.9,
SE = .13) (F(1,315) = 4.19, p = .04, ηp
2 = .01).
Table 2. Predictors of moral judgment in Experiments 1 &
2.
  B SE B Beta t  
Experiment 1          
Action 0.17 0.39 0.04 0.44  
Target -2.18 0.39 -0.57 -5.57 **
Intent 2.29 0.40 0.60 5.76 *
Moral Focus 0.02 0.40 0.01 0.05  
Conservatism 0.25 0.12 0.23 2.13 ‡
Conservatism x Action -0.13 0.10 -0.14 -1.25  
Conservatism x Target 0.33 0.10 0.36 3.13 *
Conservatism x Intent -0.22 0.10 -0.23 -2.08 ‡
Conservatism x Moral Focus 0.12 0.10 0.12 1.12  
Experiment 2          
Action -9.59 6.11 -0.20 -1.57  
Target -48.35 6.00 -1.00 -8.05 **
Conservatism -1.69 1.75 -0.10 -0.97  
Conservatism x Action 1.13 1.97 0.08 0.57  
Conservatism x Target 5.38 1.93 0.36 2.79 *
‡p < .05 *p < .01 **p < .001
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0074434.t002
Action,  Target,  and  Intent.    Replicating  prior  research
[20,32], we found a larger effect of intent on moral judgments of
harmful acts (Mint = 5.0, SE = .19; Macc = 2.9, SE = .2) relative
to  impure  acts  (Mint  =  4.6,  SE  =  .18;  Macc  =  3.8,  SE  =  .18)
(action x intent interaction; F(1,315) = 13.17, p < .001, ηp
2 = .
04). Critically, and, in line with the current predictions, we also
found  a  larger  effect  of  intent  on  moral  judgments  of  other-
directed acts (Mint = 5.7, SE = .18; Macc = 3.7, SE = .19) relative
to self-directed acts (Mint = 4.0, SE = .19; Macc = 3.1, SE = .19)
(target x intent interaction; F(1,402) = 8.49, p = .004, ηp
2 = .03).
A  follow-up  ANOVA  using  data  standardized  separately
within each condition (e.g., self-directed impure act) revealed
the same pattern of effects, including the interaction between
action and intent (F(1,323) = 12.36, p = .001, ηp
2 = .04), and the
interaction between target and intent (F(1,323) = 10.12, p = .
002, ηp
2 = .03).
Action and Target.  As in the analysis of harmfulness and
impurity  composites,  we  did  not  find  significant  interactions
between action and target (F(1,315) = 1.33, p = .25, ηp
2 < .01),
or between action, target and intent (F(1,315) = .09, p = .77, ηp
2
< .001).
Prediction  4:  Action,  Target,  and  Moral  Focus.    In  the
same  2  (action:  harmful  versus  impure)  x  2  (target:  other-
directed  versus  self-directed)  x  2  (intent:  intentional  versus
accidental) x 2 (moral focus: action versus character) ANOVA,
we did not find support for our prediction that the focus of moral
judgment (action versus character) would interact with target or
action  (all  p’s  >  .05).  The  absence  of  an  effect  may  be  a
consequence  of  the  measures  used;  in  particular,  these
measures have not been shown to reliably distinguish between
moral judgment of an action on the one hand and judgment of
moral  character  on  the  other  hand.  We  address  this  issue
below in Experiment 2.
Summary.  First, we found that, on the whole, self-directed
moral violations were judged as more impure, whereas other-
directed violations were judged as more harmful. Second, we
found  that  social  conservatism  predicted  harsher  moral
judgments to a greater degree for self-directed versus other-
directed acts. Finally, we found a larger role for intent in judging
harmful versus impure acts and, importantly, in judging other-
directed versus self-directed acts.
Experiment 2: Self-directed Acts and Moral
Character
In Experiment 1, we did not find support for the hypotheses
that self-directed or impure acts indicate poor moral character,
while other-directed or harmful acts reflect poorly on the moral
status of an action. The absence of this predicted difference
might be due to the measures we used, as these measures
have  not  been  previously  shown  to  distinguish  between
judgments  of  an  action  and  judgments  of  character.  In
Experiment 2, we adapted measures used effectively in prior
work  to  distinguish  between  moral  assessments  of  action
versus character [46].
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Participants.  We tested 166 participants (116 male; Mage =
27.2,  SDage  =  9.1)  using  Amazon  Mechanical  Turk
(www.mturk.com). Participants were English speakers from the
United  States  and  paid  twenty-six  cents  for  their  time.  10
participants  (6%)  were  excluded  from  analysis  for  failing  an
attention  check.  Notably,  the  attention  check  in  Exp  2  was
disguised  as  a  question  in  the  demographics  section  asking
about the participant’s favorite hobbies. If participants read the
instructions, they would know to indicate “none of the above”.
The smaller exclusion percentage in Exp 2 (6%) versus Exp 1
(19%) may be due to the particular attention checks used or
different payment amounts.
Procedure.    We  tested  our  hypothesis  using  a  2  (action:
harmful versus impure) x 2 (target: other-directed versus self-
directed)  x  2  (moral  focus:  action  versus  character)  mixed-
effects  design.  Participants  read  two  scenarios  depicting  a
character  committing  an  unethical  act  (e.g.,  John  once  cut
someone with a knife when he was upset; see Text S2). Unlike
Experiment 1, no intent information was explicitly provided. As
in  Experiment  1,  participants  judged  scenarios  from  a  single
condition (e.g., harmful, other-directed).
Figure 2.  The Role of Intent.  Moral severity for intentional acts (dark bars) and accidental acts (light bars). Ratings given for
harmful and impure acts (collapsing across target), and for other-directed and self-directed acts (collapsing across action). Error
bars represent ± 1 SE.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0074434.g002
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moral status of the act (e.g., Were these actions immoral?) and
three judgments of the moral status of the character (e.g., Is
John  “sick  and  twisted”?),  using  100-point  slider  scales  (cf.
[46]; see Text S2). Judgments of act and character were made
in  separate  blocks;  block  order  was  randomized  across
scenario.  Judgments  were  averaged  across  the  three  items
and  two  scenarios  to  create  composite  moral  judgments
focusing on either the action (α = .93) or character (α = .85). As
in  Experiment  1,  after  rating  all  four  scenarios,  participants
completed a brief demographics section, which included a self-
report measure of social conservatism on a 7-point Likert scale.
Results and Discussion
We  conducted  a  2  (action:  harmful  versus  impure)  x  2
(target:  other-directed  versus  self-directed)  x  2  (moral  focus:
action versus character) mixed-effects ANOVA.
Main Effects.  Effects of action, target, and moral focus on
moral  judgment  are  shown  in  Figure  3.  As  in  Experiment  1,
participants delivered harsher judgments for impure acts (M =
56.5, SE = 2) versus harmful acts (M = 50.7, SE = 1.9) (main
effect of action; F(1,152) = 4.46, p = .036, ηp
2 = .03). Also, as in
Experiment  1,  participants  delivered  harsher  judgments  for
other-directed acts (M = 70.2, SE = 1.9) versus self-directed
acts (M = 36.9, SE = 2) (main effect of target; F(1,152) = 146.5,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .49). Unlike Experiment 1, participants delivered
similarly harsh judgments when focusing on the character (M =
53.6, SE = 1.5) and action (M = 53.6, SE = 1.8).
Action,  Target,  and  Moral  Focus.    As  in  Experiment  1,
there was no significant interaction between action and moral
focus  (F(1,152)  =  .47,  p  =  .49,  ηp
2  =  .003).  Critically,  an
interaction emerged between target and moral focus (F(1,152)
= 17.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11), indicating that self-directed acts
elicited harsher judgments of character (M = 40.9, SE = 2.2)
than action (M = 33.0, SE = 2.6) (t(75) = -2.6, p = .01), whereas
other-directed acts elicited harsher judgments of action (M =
74.3, SE = 2.5) than character (M = 66.3, SE = 2.1) (t(79) =
3.6, p < .001). We also found a marginal interaction between
action and target (F(1,152) = 3.47, p = .06, ηp
2 = .02), such that
impure acts were judged as morally worse than harmful acts,
more  for  self-directed  acts  compared  to  other-directed  acts.
Finally,  there  was  no  interaction  between  action,  target  and
moral focus (F(1,152) = .83, p = .36, ηp
2 < .01).
Action,  Target,  and  Social  Conservatism.    As  in
Experiment  1,  we  conducted  a  linear  regression  predicting
moral  judgments  (averaging  across  action  and  character
judgments) based off of the action and target manipulations,
self-reported  social  conservatism,  and  interaction  effects
between  conservatism  and  experimental  manipulations.  The
predictors, shown in Table 2, explained 53% of the variance in
moral judgment (F(5,150) = 34.06, p < .001). As in Experiment
1, target predicted moral judgments (i.e., participants delivered
harsher  judgments  of  other-directed  acts  versus  self-directed
acts); action (i.e., harmful versus impure) was not a significant
predictor of moral judgment. Conservatism was not a unique
predictor  of  moral  severity,  and  there  was  no  interaction
between action and conservatism. Critically, as in Experiment
1, there was an interaction between target and conservatism,
such  that  conservatism  was  a  better  predictor  of  moral
judgment for self-directed acts versus other-directed acts.
Summary.  Using previously validated measures, we found
support for the hypothesis that participants judge self-directed
acts more harshly when focusing on the character of the actor
versus the moral status of the action. By contrast, participants
judged other-directed acts more harshly when focusing on the
action  versus  character.  There  was  no  significant  interaction
between  moral  focus  (character  vs.  action)  and  the  type  of
action  performed  (impure  vs.  harmful).  Finally,  as  in
Experiment  1,  social  conservatism  predicted  harsher  moral
judgments  to  a  greater  degree  for  self-directed  acts  versus
other-directed acts.
General Discussion
Across two experiments, we found support for the account
that the target of a moral violation (e.g., oneself versus other
person)  influences  whether  that  violation  is  processed  as  a
harm  violation  or  a  purity  violation.  This  feature  of  target
influenced  moral  judgment  in  the  expected  direction,  for
separate  behavioral  signatures  established  in  prior  work  to
reflect key differences in the processing of harm versus purity
violations. Before we discuss implications of the present work,
we offer a brief summary of the key findings.
First,  in  Experiment  1,  participants  judged  self-directed
violations as relatively more impure than harmful. By contrast,
participants judged other-directed violations as relatively more
harmful than impure. Second, across both experiments, self-
reported  social  conservatism  uniquely  predicted  harsh  moral
judgments  of  self-directed  acts,  but  not  other-directed  acts.
Third, in Experiment 1, we found a larger role for intent in moral
judgments  of  other-directed  versus  self-directed  acts:
intentionally  acting  on  another  person  was  judged  morally
worse  than  accidentally  acting  on  the  person,  but  this
difference  was  smaller  for  acts  directed  toward  the  self.  We
also  found  a  smaller  role  of  intent  for  judgments  of  harmful
versus impure acts, mirroring prior work [20,32]. Finally, using
validated  dependent  measures  in  Experiment  2,  participants
provided harsher moral judgments of character versus action
for self-directed acts; the opposite pattern emerged for other-
directed acts.
The  present  findings  are  consistent  with  the  proposed
adaptive functions of harm and purity norms [4,29,40]. If harm
norms  regulate  interpersonal  behavior,  they  may  apply
uniquely to behavior involving two or more individuals [33,34].
Indeed, any other-directed negative behavior may be construed
as harmful, even if actual physical harm is absent [41,49–51].
Conversely, if purity norms ultimately serve to protect the self
from  pathogens  (and  consequent  harm)  [1,15,21,24,35–37],
they may relate to any behavior that can be seen as harmful to
oneself, even if the behavior does not contain typical elicitors of
“bodily” disgust (for discussion see 21,22,39). This feature of
purity norms appears to obtain even when people judge other
people’s  self-directed  actions,  perhaps  because  people
simulate those self-directed actions [52].
Our account faces two specific challenges from competing
models of moral emotions (e.g., [16]). The first challenge is for
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violations  or  self-directed  acts.  As  noted  in  our  introduction,
prior work has shown that violations of harm and fairness may
also elicit disgust [14–19]. If disgust is a general moral emotion,
how  can  it  be  used  to  distinguish  one  moral  domain  from
another? We suggest that moral violations of harm, fairness,
and purity norms may all evoke multiple emotions (e.g., anger,
disgust)  to  varying  degrees.  Recent  research  suggests  that
disgust is in fact a relevant emotion in the domain of harm, but
not in comparison to anger [15,17,18], see 21 for discussion.
Other work has found “moral disgust” to be even more morally
relevant than anger [16]; however, follow-up work suggests that
this difference may be due to the inclusion of the word “moral”
as a qualifier for disgust but not anger [53]. Indeed, research
that has measured both disgust and anger in response to harm
and purity violations finds the pattern observed in the present
data:  both  harm  and  purity  violations  elicit  both  anger  and
disgust,  but  harms  are  preferentially  linked  to  anger,  while
purity  violations  are  preferentially  linked  to  disgust
[11,13,20,53].
Figure 3.  Moral Judgments of Action and Character.  Moral judgments delivered when focusing on action (dark bars) and
character (light bars). Ratings given for harmful and impure acts (collapsing across target), and for other-directed and self-directed
acts (collapsing across action). Error bars represent ± 1 SE.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0074434.g003
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account of moral emotions [16]. Moral anger is proposed to be
an adaptive response to self-relevant immoral acts (e.g., I get
angry if someone hits me), while moral disgust is the result of
an appraisal of others who have immoral dispositions but who
are not immediately threatening to us. We note that the “self /
other”  distinction  in  the  social-functionalist  account  is  distinct
from the “self / other” distinction used in the present research.
Moral  interactions  typically  involve  at  least  three  “roles”-an
agent (who commits the immoral act), a target (who is primarily
affected), and a judge (who deems the act to be wrong) [54].
Different  individuals  may  play  different  roles  in  a  moral
interaction, or the same individual may take on multiple roles.
On the social-functionalist account, when the target and judge
are  the  same  person  (e.g.,  A  student  steals  your  exam  and
copies it, and you judge the student for acting in this way), the
immoral  act  is  “self-relevant”  and  is  associated  with  anger
primarily; when the target and judge are different people (e.g.,
A student steals another student’s exam and copies it), the act
is less self-relevant and is associated with moral disgust. On
our account, when the agent and target are the same person
(e.g., self-cutting), the act is self-directed and is associated with
disgust and impurity; when the agent and target are different
people (e.g., cutting someone else), the act is other-directed
and associated with anger and harm. We note that these two
accounts of moral emotions and the self / other distinction are
not  mutually  exclusive,  and  future  research  should  more
directly explore the links between them.
The present research examined the unique role of target in
determining domain membership, but we emphasize here our
results do not show the target of a moral act is the primary
determinant  of  moral  domain  membership.  First,  the  type  of
action performed (harmful versus impure) played a critical role
in  determining  domain  membership  in  the  current  work.
Collapsing across target, we found that harmful acts were still
judged  as  more  harmful  than  impure,  and  impure  acts  were
judged  as  more  impure  than  harmful.  Second,  we  found  a
larger role of intent for harmful versus impure acts, as in prior
work, again collapsing across target. Nevertheless, it is worth
noting that comparing acts that shared features of both harm
and purity violations (i.e., self-directed harm and other-directed
impurity) revealed a key role of target in determining domain
membership.  For  example,  self-directed  harmful  acts  were
judged as more impure than harmful and also as more impure
than  other-directed  impure  acts.  Meanwhile,  other-directed
impure acts were judged as more harmful than impure and also
as more harmful than self-directed harmful acts.
One unpredicted finding was that action and target emerged
as  relatively  independent  predictors  of  our  behavioral
“signatures” of domain membership. In Experiment 1, we did
not  find  any  interactions  that  involved  action  and  target,  in
either the analyses of harmfulness and impurity composites, or
in the analyses of moral judgments. In Experiment 2, we found
a  marginal  interaction  between  action  and  target,  such  that
impure acts were judged as morally worse than harmful acts,
more  for  self-directed  acts  compared  to  other-directed  acts.
However, we found no interaction between action, target, and
moral  focus.  The  general  absence  of  interactions  among
variables suggests that people may process action and target
independently  when  determining  domain  membership—
whether an act is a harm violation or a purity violation.
The present work may shed light on why some acts appear
to  crosscut  domain  boundaries.  Heinous  harms  may  evoke
disgust;  indeed,  the  violator  himself  may  appear  to  be
contaminated  by  his  actions,  and  his  moral  character  may
therefore  seem  contagious  –  e.g.,  nobody  wants  to  wear
Hitler’s sweater [1]. One account of this effect is that extreme
harms  are  downright  strange.  When  harmful  acts  are
uncommon  or  bizarre,  they  may  be  judged  as  primarily
reflective of poor moral character. One recent study features
scenarios in which a man becomes angry with his girlfriend and
either abuses her or abuses her cat. The latter act seems more
out of the ordinary and thus carries more information about the
perpetrator  and  his  desires  [45,46,55]  (see  also  16).  Self-
directed acts (both harmful and impure) may appear to be less
typical,  driving  the  specific  effects  associated  with  moral
character  judgments  reported  here.  Notably,  though,  such
effects ultimately derive from the manipulation of the target of
the act, underscoring our suggestion that domain membership
depends on more than simply the kind of action performed –
not all immoral harmful acts are judged equivalently as harm
violations.
Given potential overlap across moral domains, we suggest
that domains do not necessarily represent discrete categories
or  natural  moral  “kinds”.  Instead,  moral  judgment  reflects  a
complex calculus performed over multiple independent features
of an event. Thus, the actions of an agent like Hannibal Lecter
may be perceived as simultaneously harmful and impure. The
apparent  categorical  nature  of  moral  domains  may  be  an
artifact of past research, including our own. This research has
emphasized  differences  in  moral  judgment  by  comparing
domain “exemplars” such as murder and incest, while paying
less  attention  to  features  of  behaviors  that  may  blur  domain
boundaries. Future work should aim to examine moral attitudes
in  response  to  a  larger  and  more  diverse  set  of  behaviors,
including those that do not obviously fall into one domain or
another.
Future research should also move beyond the investigation
of harm and purity to a broader investigation of the cues that
determine  membership  in  other  moral  domains,  including
fairness,  in-group  loyalty,  and  respect  for  authority  [2,3,23].
Here we examined the cues of action and target in determining
domain membership with respect to harm and purity, but other
cues may be more relevant for other domains. For example,
perceiving  fairness  and  authority  violations  may  hinge  on
knowledge of the relationship between the interacting agents
[56,57]. While relationship knowledge is undoubtedly important
for judging the severity of harm violations, it may be less critical
for determining whether or not harm occurred in the first place.
In  addition,  judgments  of  in-group  loyalty  necessitate
knowledge  of  the  agent’s  group  membership  but  not
necessarily the agent’s relationship to a specific target or victim
(e.g., washing one’s toilet with the US flag [2,6]). The current
work  represents  a  first  step  in  understanding  not  only  how
moral  judgments  differ  across  domains  but  also  how  these
domains are determined in the first place.
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Figure S1.  Perceived harmfulness and impurity, separate
measures.  Separate  judgments  of  harmfulness  (anger,
damage)  and  impurity  (disgust,  unnaturalness),  in  raw  form
(1.a.)  as  well  as  standardized,  controlling  for  effects  on  the
opposing measure (1.b.). Error bars represent ± 1 SE.
(TIF)
Text S1.  Additional Analyses. In the main text, we report the
effects  of  target  and  action  on  composite  measures  of
perceived  harmfulness  (anger  and  damage  judgments)  and
perceived  impurity  (disgust  and  unnaturalness  judgments).
Here we report results from two mixed effects ANOVAs on the
individual measures used to construct the composites.
(DOCX)
Text  S2.    Stimuli  and  Measures.  Stimuli  and  dependent
measures used in experiments 1 and 2 are reported in full.
(DOCX)
Acknowledgements
We thank Daniel Gilbert, Kurt Gray, Fiery Cushman, Joshua
Rottman, Jordan Theriault, Lily Tsoi, Sara Gottlieb, and Laura
Young for helpful discussion, and two anonymous reviewers for
helpful suggestions.
Author Contributions
Conceived  and  designed  the  experiments:  AC  JD  LY.
Performed the experiments: AC. Analyzed the data: AC. Wrote
the manuscript: AC.
References
1. Rozin P, Lowery L, Imada S, Haidt J (1999) The CAD triad hypothesis:
a mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust)
and  three  moral  codes  (community,  autonomy,  divinity).  J  Pers  Soc
Psychol  76(4):  574–586.  doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.574.  PubMed:
10234846.
2. Haidt J (2007) The new synthesis in moral Psychol. Science 316(5827):
998–1002. doi:10.1126/science.1137651. PubMed: 17510357.
3. Graham J, Haidt J, Nosek BA (2009) Liberals and conservatives rely on
different sets of moral foundations. J Pers Soc Psychol 96(5): 1029–
1046. doi:10.1037/a0015141. PubMed: 19379034.
4. Dungan  J,  Young  L  (2012)  The  two-type  model  of  morality.  In  D
Fassin, Companion to Moral Anthro. Wiley-Blackwell.
5. Haidt  J,  Bjorklund  F,  Murphy  S  (2000)  Moral  dumbfounding:  When
intuition finds no reason. Unpublished manuscript, U of VA
6. Haidt  J  (2001)  The  emotional  dog  and  its  rational  tail:  a  Social
intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychol Rev 108(4): 814–834.
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814. PubMed: 11699120.
7. Haidt J, Hersh MA (2001) Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions
of  Conservatives  and  Liberals.  J  Appl  Soc  Psychol  31(1):  191.  doi:
10.1111/j.1559-1816.2001.tb02489.x.
8. Wheatley T, Haidt J (2005) Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments
more  severe.  Psychol  Sci  16(10):  780–784.  doi:10.1111/j.
1467-9280.2005.01614.x. PubMed: 16181440.
9. Seidel  A,  Prinz  J  (2013)  Sound  morality:  Irritating  and  icky  noises
amplify judgments in divergent moral domains. Cognition 127(1): 1–5.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.11.004. PubMed: 23318349.
10. Salerno J, Peter-Hagene LC (2013) The Interactive Effect of Anger and
Disgust in Moral Outrage and Judgments. Psychol Sci XX: XX
11. Gutierrez R, Giner-Sorolla R (2007) Anger, disgust, and presumption of
harm as reactions to taboo-breaking Behavs. Emotion 7(4): 853–868.
doi:10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.853. PubMed: 18039054.
12. Horberg  EJ,  Oveis  C,  Keltner  D,  Cohen  AB  (2009)  Disgust  and  the
moralization of purity. J Pers Soc Psychol 97(6): 963–976. doi:10.1037/
a0017423. PubMed: 19968413.
13. Giner-Sorolla R, Bosson JK, Caswell TA, Hettinger VE (2012) Emotions
in  sexual  morality:  Testing  the  separate  elicitors  of  anger  and
disgust.  Cogn  Emotion  26(7):  1208–1222.  doi:
10.1080/02699931.2011.645278. PubMed: 22414214.
14. Cannon  PR,  Schnall  S,  White  M  (2011)  Transgressions  and
expressions Affective facial muscle activity predicts moral judgments.
Soc Psychol Pers Sci 2(3): 325. doi:10.1177/1948550610390525.
15. Chapman HA, Kim DA, Susskind JM, Anderson AK (2009) In bad taste:
Evidence  for  the  oral  origins  of  moral  disgust.  Science  323(5918):
1222–1226. doi:10.1126/science.1165565. PubMed: 19251631.
16. Hutcherson  CA,  Gross  JJ  (2011)  The  moral  emotions:  a  Social-
functionalist  account  of  anger,  disgust,  and  contempt.  J  Pers  Soc
Psychol 100(4): 719–737. doi:10.1037/a0022408. PubMed: 21280963.
17. Jones  A,  Fitness  J  (2009)  Moral  hypervigilance:  The  influence  of
disgust sensitivity in the moral domain. Emotion 8: 613–627. PubMed:
18837611.
18. Schnall S, Haidt J, Clore GL, Jordan AH (2008) Disgust as embodied
moral  judgment.  Pers  Soc  Psychol  Bull  34:  1096–1109.  doi:
10.1177/0146167208317771. PubMed: 18505801.
19. Simpson  J,  Carter  S,  Anthony  SH,  Overton  PG  (2006)  Is  disgust  a
homogeneous emotion? Motiv Emotion 30(1): 31.
20. Russell PS, Giner-Sorolla R (2011) Moral anger, but not moral disgust,
responds  to  intentionality.  Emotion  11(2):  233–240.  doi:10.1037/
a0022598. PubMed: 21500892.
21. Russell  PS,  Giner-Sorolla  R  (2013)  Bodily  moral  disgust:  What  it  is,
how  it  is  different  from  anger,  and  why  it  is  an  unreasoned
emotion.  Psychol  Bull  139(2):  328–351.  doi:10.1037/a0029319.
PubMed: 23458436.
22. Inbar Y, Pizarro DA, Bloom P (2009) Conservatives are more easily
disgusted  than  liberals.  Cogn  Emotion  23(4):  714.  doi:
10.1080/02699930802110007.
23. Graham J, Nosek BA, Haidt J, Iyer R, Koleva S et al. (2011) Mapping
the moral domain. J Pers Soc Psychol 101(2): 366–385. doi:10.1037/
a0021847. PubMed: 21244182.
24. Janoff-Bulman R (2009) To provide or protect: Motivational bases of
political  liberalism  and  conservatism.  Psychol  Inq  20(2-3):  120.  doi:
10.1080/10478400903028581.
25. Moll J, Zahn R, de Oliveira-Souza R, Krueger F, Grafman J (2005) The
neural basis of human moral cognition. Nat Rev Neurosci 6(10): 799–
809. doi:10.1038/nrn1768. PubMed: 16276356.
26. Schaich Borg J, Lieberman D, Kiehl KA (2008) Infection, incest, and
iniquity: Investigating the neural correlates of disgust and morality. J
Cogn  Neurosci  20(9):  1529–1546.  doi:10.1162/jocn.2008.20109.
PubMed: 18345982.
27. Parkinson  C,  Sinnott-Armstrong  W,  Koralus  PE,  Mendelovici  A,
McGeer V et al. (2011) Is morality unified? Evidence that distinct neural
systems underlie moral judgments of harm, dishonesty, and disgust. J
Cogn  Neurosci  23(10):  3162–3180.  doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00017.
PubMed: 21452951.
28. Lewis  GJ,  Kanai  R,  Bates  TC,  Rees  G  (2012)  Moral  values  are
associated with individual differences in regional brain volume. J Cogn
Neurosci  24(8):  1657–1663.  doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00239.  PubMed:
22571458.
29. Young L, Tsoi L (2013) When Mental States Matter, When They Don’t,
and What it Means for Morality. Soc Pers Psychol Compass
30. Russell  PS,  Giner-Sorolla  R  (2011)  Social  justifications  for  moral
emotions: When reasons for disgust are less elaborated than for anger.
Emotion 11(3): 637–646. doi:10.1037/a0022600. PubMed: 21534665.
31. Russell PS, Giner-Sorolla R (2011) Moral Anger Is More Flexible Than
Moral  Disgust.  Soc  Psychol  Pers  Sci  2(4):  360.  doi:
10.1177/1948550610391678.
What Determines a Moral Domain?
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 11 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e7443432. Young L, Saxe R (2011) When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles
for  intent  across  moral  domains.  Cognition  120(2):  202–214.  doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.005. PubMed: 21601839.
33. Gray K, Wegner DM (2009) Moral typecasting: divergent perceptions of
moral agents and moral patients. J Pers Soc Psychol 96(3): 505–520.
doi:10.1037/a0013748. PubMed: 19254100.
34. Gray K, Young L, Waytz A (2012) Mind perception is the essence of
morality.  Psychol  Inq  23(2):  101–124.  doi:10.1080/1047840X.
2012.651387. PubMed: 22754268.
35. Navarrete  CD,  Fessler  DM  (2006)  Disease  avoidance  and
ethnocentrism:  The  effects  of  disease  vulnerability  and  disgust
sensitivity  on  intergroup  attitudes.  Evol  Hum  Behav  27(4):  270.  doi:
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.12.001.
36. Pizarro D, Inbar Y, Helion C (2011) On disgust and moral judgment.
Emotion Rev 3(3): 267. doi:10.1177/1754073911402394.
37. Tybur  JM,  Lieberman  D,  Kurzban  R,  DeScioli  P  (2012)  Disgust:
Evolved function and structure. Psychol Rev 120(1): 65–84. PubMed:
23205888.
38. Janoff-Bulman  R,  Sheikh  S,  Baldacci  KG  (2008)  Mapping  moral
motives:  Approach,  avoidance,  and  political  orientation.  J  Exp  Soc
Psychol 44(4): 1091. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.11.003.
39. Chapman HA, Anderson AK (2013) Things rank and gross in nature: A
Review and synthesis of moral disgust. Psychol Bull 139(2): 300–327.
doi:10.1037/a0030964. PubMed: 23458435.
40. Dungan  J,  Chakroff  A,  Young  L.  Purity  versus  Pain:  Distinct  moral
norms for self and other (submitted for publication).
41. Cushman F (2008) Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of
causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition 108(2):
353–380. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006. PubMed: 18439575.
42. Mikhail J (2007) Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence and the
future.  Trends  Cogn  Sci  11(4):  143–152.  doi:10.1016/j.tics.
2006.12.007. PubMed: 17329147.
43. Young L, Cushman F, Hauser M, Saxe R (2007) The neural basis of
the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment. Proc Natl
Acad  Sci  USA  104(20):  8235–8240.  doi:10.1073/pnas.0701408104.
PubMed: 17485679.
44. Waytz  A,  Gray  K,  Epley  N,  Wegner  DM  (2010)  Causes  and
consequences of mind perception. Trends Cogn Sci 14(8): 383–388.
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.006. PubMed: 20579932.
45. Pizarro DA, Tannenbaum D (2011) Bringing character back: How the
motivation  to  evaluate  character  influences  judgments  of  moral
blame. In The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of
good and evil: APA Press. 91.
46. Tannenbaum D, Uhlmann EL, Diermeier D (2011) Moral signals, public
outrage, and immaterial harms. J Exp Soc Psychol 47(6): 1249. doi:
10.1016/j.jesp.2011.05.010.
47. Rozin P, Nemeroff C (1990) The laws of sympathetic magic. In Cultural
Psychol:  Essays  on  comparative  human  development  (205).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
48. Baker P (2004) ‘Unnatural Acts’: Discourses of homosexuality within
the House of Lords debates on gay male law reform. J Sociolinguistics
8(1): 88. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9841.2004.00252.x.
49. Inbar Y, Pizarro DA (2013) Pollution and purity in moral and political
judgment.  Draft  submitted  for  inclusion  in  Advances  in  Experimental
Moral  Psychology:  Affect,  Character,  and  Commitments.  Continuum
Press.
50. Cushman F, Gray K, Gaffey A, Mendes WB (2012) Simulating murder:
the  aversion  to  harmful  action.  Emotion  12(1):  2–7.  doi:10.1037/
a0025071. PubMed: 21910540.
51. Pronin  E,  Wegner  DM,  McCarthy  K,  Rodriguez  S  (2006)  Everyday
magical  powers:  the  role  of  apparent  mental  causation  in  the
overestimation of personal influence. J Pers Soc Psychol 91(2): 218–
231. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.2.218. PubMed: 16881760.
52. Cushman  FA  (2013)  Action,  outcome  and  value:  A  dual-system
framework  for  morality.  Pers  Soc  Psychol  Rev  17(3):  273–292.  doi:
10.1177/1088868313495594. PubMed: 23861355.
53. Russell PS, Piazza J, Giner-Sorolla R (2013) CAD Revisited Effects of
the  Word  Moral  on  the  Moral  Relevance  of  Disgust  (and  Other
Emotions).  Soc  Psychol  Pers  Sci  4(1):  62.  doi:
10.1177/1948550612442913.
54. DeScioli P, Kurzban R (2009) Mysteries of morality. Cognition 112(2):
281–299. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.008. PubMed: 19505683.
55. Inbar Y, Pizarro DA, Cushman F (2012) Benefiting From Misfortune:
When Harmless Actions Are Judged to Be Morally Blameworthy. Pers
Soc Psychol Bull 38(1): 52–62: 52. PubMed: 22214885
56. Fiske  AP,  Haslam  N  (1996)  Social  cognition  is  thinking  about
relationships.  Curr  Dir  Psychol  Sci  5(5):  143.  doi:
10.1111/1467-8721.ep11512349.
57. McGraw AP, Tetlock P (2005) Taboo trade-offs, relational framing, and
the  acceptability  of  exchanges.  J  Consum  Psychol  15(1):  2.  doi:
10.1207/s15327663jcp1501_2.
What Determines a Moral Domain?
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 12 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e74434